AbstractAlgorithms based on the circulation of a unique token are often indicated in the design of distributed solutions for Grids. We introduce the design of the token passing operation at application level, that exhibits the requirements of security, since the token is a sensitive resource, and scalability, since the token passing protocol must not implement security at expense of scalability. These characteristics make our solution suitable for Grid environments.
I. Introduction
The availability of a token passing operation is often considered in the design of a number of distributed algorithms: for instance, the numberless members of the "selfstabilizing" family, originated from an idea of E.J. Dijkstra [5] addressing mutual exclusion. However, the design of the token passing operation is usually regarded as an implementation detail: while this is true when applied at link level (as in [4] ), where the hardware support natively provides a reliable token passing primitive, it becomes less evident when a token based approach is used in the design of an application level solution.
Such a case is of interest in a GRID environment, where the availability of a token passing operation can simplify the coordination of complex distributed activities: for instance, the work presented in this paper supports the maintenance of a distributed directory in a GRID network monitoring architecture, described in [3] but not considered here.
In such a case we are presented with an unreliable support, where information loss is a frequent event, with a membership that is dynamic, in an environment where the presence of malicious agents is a matter of fact: the implementation of the token passing operation in such an environment becomes a challenge.
Each agent has an incomplete information about the membership within which the token is circulated: the existence of a centralized description of the membership would collide with elementary requirements of scalability and reliability. Therefore the token passing operation must take into account that the token may be received from an untrusted peer: one of the functionalities of the token passing operation must be that of assessing the validity of a received token. Malicious users may interfere with the token passing operation as well as with the functionality it supports: therefore the participants must be authenticated at every step.
The token passing operation must be resilient to network failures: as far as possible, it should avoid both the loss and the duplication of the token. Despite its appealing characteristics of reliability, the TCP protocol is not recommended to transfer a single short piece of data. In fact, resource consuming operations like connection setup, window sizing etc are useless for our purpose, and exposed to threats. The Internet transport protocol that appears as more appropriate for the task of carrying a token is UDP: but then reliability requirements must be coped with within the token passing operation.
In the next section we describe a framework for our token passing operation; the discussion is concluded with the statement of the requirements for its implementation, which is introduced in the successive section, where we exhaustively analyze the communication protocol using state diagrams to describe its internals. Finally we describe the results of our experiments in the Internet.
II. Requirements for an application level token passing protocol
A token is a piece of data that enables one member of a set of entities to perform a related activity. The token passing protocol is completely orthogonal to the activity it enables: therefore we consider as appropriate that the token contains only information finalized to the token passing operation itself: any other data flow will be operated as part of the related activity. The relevant features of the token are that it is unique, and that it visits all partners in a fair way.
To enforce the existence of the token, first step to ensure its uniqueness, we need to introduce a way to detect and recover from its loss. In fact, the occurrence of this event cannot be excluded: despite the required resilience of the token passing protocol to hardware/software failures, we cannot avoid that an agent silently fails while holding the token.
In our protocol, the detection of such an event is based on an estimate of the time between two successive hits of the token on a certain agent, which is often referred as the commute time. If a token is not observed for a time exceeding by several times the expected commute time, a new token is generated by the agent that observes the delay. This rule introduces an undesirable inactivity after a token loss event, while waiting for the occurrence of the first timeout. Therefore we design the protocol so that the token is not lost in the quite frequent event of a transient network failure. This is the one requirement for the token passing protocol.
The statistic variability of the commute time may induce the introduction of a spurious token in the system, thus justifying the existence of a token removal rule, which is the second step to ensure token uniqueness. Unlike previous rules, which are based on statistic considerations, this rule is deterministic: if an agent is hit, sequentially, by token A, token B, and again by token A, then it can conclude that token B is spurious, and remove it at the next hit. This entails that tokens are identified by a unique label, which is needed to implement the above rule. This fact requires that the design of the token passing protocol is particularly careful in avoiding token duplication, since recovery from such an event can be very slow. This comes as another requirement.
The implementation of local rules to generate and remove tokens requires that tokens are authenticated. Since the presence of a centralized source of unforgeable tokens is incompatible with scalability and reliability requirements, the token is signed by the source each time it is passed. This entails the use of public/private keys for each member, delivered to the member at startup by a centralized Certification Authority.
We observe that a new agent willing to enter the membership must be given the opportunity to get in touch with one of the members. A quite natural way to implement a join event is to give the joining agent a new token, and the address of one member: its first action will be to authenticate and send the token to the indicated member, thus gaining the opportunity to enter the membership. The spurious token thus generated will be eventually removed by the above mentioned removal rule. An advertisement of the join event will be included in the token, and all agents reached by the advertisement will participate in its propagation, by including it in all observed tokens.
Leave events will be treated as network failures, and after repeated failures the member will be removed from local directories. We do not discuss further this aspect, although we recognize its importance in our frame, since it is only marginally related with our goal of stating the requirements for a token passing protocol.
One way to ensure a fair circulation of the token is to bind the system into a configurable topology, like a ring [8] , or a tree [10] . This approach suffers from events that modify the configuration: time is required to detect the event and more time to reconfigure the topology. Therefore we propose a different strategy, that considers the token as randomly moving in a full mesh, which is adherent to a transport level view of the Internet (see [1] for a similar approach): this option does not restrict the applicability of our implementation of the token passing operation to randomized algorithms, but demonstrates its applicability in a framework that is more demanding than that of a configurable layout.
In order to justify the fairness of a token circulation based on random walks, we consider that random walks exhibit a random period between hits of the same host, the commute time mentioned above, whose knowledge is used for token regeneration. It is a well known theoretical result [7] that in a regular graph, like a any subgraph of the Internet, the distribution of the commute time of a random walk is a stationery random process.
The above discussion about the commute time relies on the hypothesis that each token passing operation takes a time characterized by a low dispersion, near to the minimum: this is one relevant requirement for our token passing protocol.
The token passing operation takes place between members of a trusted membership, whose maintenance is a prerequisite for the application of a randomized token circulation. Here we do not want to introduce an optimized solution, but we address a basic one where all members have a convergent image of the whole membership, recorded in a directory managed locally that tends to match the real membership. Each record in the directory contains, together with the identity of the member, its public key, used to ensure a secure token passing operation.
The solution we indicate for membership maintenance consists in associating with each token passing operation a synchronization of the local directories. According to this solution, we consider that the token implicitly carries the advertisement of a join event: the time needed to inform all members about this event (the cover time) has an average of n log(n), where n is the number of agents in the membership. The derivation of this analytic result is an elementary exercise in random walks theory: a graceful introduction is in [7] .
This result indicates that a random walk approach is appropriate when the latency of a join event is not a critical performance figure. Many practical cases admit this restriction: consider, for instance, a distributed file system where data sets are replicated. The latency between the creation of a new instance of a data set and its advertisement to each and every proxy can be separated by a time which is not critical. One may devise the introduction of several tokens in order to reduce update latency: this technique increases the network overhead (which will grow linearly with the size of the system, thus keeping linear the traffic per edge), while keeping update latency nearly constant: simulation results for this alternative are in [2] .
This straightforward solution is scalable, since just one synchronization of local databases will occur in the system at any given time, regardless of system size. The maintenance of a local directory of the whole membership is considered as a simplification, and hierarchical solutions (for instance DNS extensions) are known to address the case when this becomes a scalability limit. Here we do not want to specifically discuss these solutions, but the token passing operation, once the membership directory is accessible.
The relevant conclusions of this section, which will be used in next sections, are the requirements for a token passing operation which is suitable to support a randomized token circulation algorithm:
• token passing latency distribution is concentrated near the minimum value;
• token loss probability is near to token holder failure;
• token duplication is deterministically excluded;
• the token is authenticated by the sender at each token passing operation.
The next section details the token passing protocol. We first give a description that does not take into account issues that specifically address security, in the hope of improving readability. The successive subsection III-B deals more specifically with security.
III. Design of a token passing operation
The token passing operation is split into a sequence of datagram exchanges (see figure 1 ) between the source and the destination of the token, similar to what happens when a TCP connection [12] is established. We indicate the UDP protocol [11] as a candidate to support the information exchange. Each datagram in the token exchange protocol is a data object containing:
• a token id;
• a session id: this is generated by the token sender, by incrementing the id of the session with which it received the token;
• a type tag for the datagram; • a timestamp field, which may contain random data;
• a signature, optionally replaced by a certificate, as detailed below;
Note that the token, in itself, is an empty piece of data characterized by an identifier.
The first datagram is sent between the source and a well known port at the destination. It announces the intention to move the token and is indicated as a move datagram. The datagram contains a DSA signature [9] , obtained using the private key of the sender on the content of the datagram.
After sending a move datagram, the receiver starts waiting for a ack datagram before a timeout expires. In case the timeout expires, the source repeats the send operation, until either an ack is received, or the maximum number of retries is exceeded. In the latter case the token passing operation fails, and the source holds the token. After the first timeout, the source piggybacks a certificate to the datagram. The certificate consists of the public key of the source, encrypted and signed by the Certification Authority.
Upon receipt of the move message, if the destination already knows the public key of the source, it checks the signature of the datagram. Otherwise, if the public key of the source is unknown, it discards the message. It is in charge of the source, whenever the ack timeout expires, to send the certificate of the sender. In this case, upon receipt of the certificate, the destination decrypts and stores the public key of the source in the local database.
After successfully checking the move datagram, the destination records the session id associated with the token, as part of the soft state of the token. Next it prepares and sends the ack datagram to the source, using the port indicated in the move datagram. The first two fields, namely the token id and the session id, are the same as of the move datagram, but the destination updates the timestamp using a local timestamp, indicates a local port for protocol continuation, and replaces the signature with one obtained using the local private key. The ack datagram is sent back to the source, and the destination will timeout the receipt of a commit datagram. As in the case of the move datagram, after the timeout expires the first time, the datagram will be resent a limited number of times, piggybacking the public key signed by the Certification Authority. In case the number of retries exceeds the limit, the token passing fails and the destination considers the source still holds the token.
As soon as the source receives an ack datagram on the expected port, it checks the validity of the content using the public key of the source, in case it is known. Otherwise, it silently drops the datagram and waits for the following, which should contain the certificate. If the ack is valid it considers the token as successfully passed, and sends a commit datagram to the destination. Any activity connected with the presence of the token is (forcibly) terminated at that time.
The commit datagram contains, besides the identifiers of the token and of the token passing operation, a local timestamp and the signature. It is resent a limited number of times, until an early stop datagram is received. We do not consider to complement the commit datagram with a certificate. Also in case the number of resend operations exceeds the limit, the token passing protocol terminates successfully, since the receipt of the early stop datagram has effect only on the timing of the protocol.
Upon receipt of a valid commit datagram, the destination considers the token passing operation to be successfully concluded, and the activity related to the presence of the token is triggered. After this it sends a single early stop datagram.
The rationale behind the introduction of the early stop datagram is in the first requirements stated in section II: the receipt of this type of datagram interrupts the sequence of repeated commit datagrams, which would otherwise significantly increase the token passing latency.
An exhaustive description of the protocol informally described so far is in figures 2 and 3. Two separate state diagrams are needed to describe the behavior of the source and of the destination. Blue arrows indicate transitions in absence of token losses and authentication failures. Green labels indicate transition that entail a send operation. Rounded boxes indicate exit (or entry) points: red ones indicate a failure (return undef in Perl idiom), otherwise the returned value. The next section describes the operation of the protocol for the relevant operations of join and leave.
A. Join and leave
Whenever a new member joins the membership the Certification Authority delivers it, using a secure channel, a certificate consisting of a public/private key pair, and of the signature of the public key by the Certification Authority, and the address of one member. It is intended that the public key of the Certification Authority is available to every possible destination of the token: this is the only piece of centralized data.
After initialization, the joining member sends a fresh to- ken to the member indicated by the Certification Authority. The first move datagram is ignored, since the destination cannot authenticate the signature, but the second, containing the public key authenticated by the Certification Authority, is accepted. In addition, since the database hashes will not match, the database of the joining agent will be synchronized with that of the destination. The spurious token thus generated will soon be removed.
The event of a leave is associated to the failure of successive token passing operations. In that event, the agent holding the token immediately starts a new token passing operation with another partner, and takes a record of the failure. After a number of token delivery failures, the agent issues a leave event for the partner.
B. Discussion
This section is devoted to a number of points that emerge during the detailed description of the protocol: in order to make it more fluent, we prefer to separately justify some design options. We start by briefly proving that our solution conforms the requirements described in section II, next we give a precise statement of security issues.
The first requirement in section II states that the protocol must exclude deterministically the duplication of the token. To prove that our protocol satisfies the requirement, we note that the event of duplication occurs only if i) the source detects a protocol failure, and therefore holds the token, and ii) the destination detects a success, and holds the same token. Since the second condition occurs only when a commit datagram is received, which is sent by the source only when it considers the token passing operation successful, we conclude that the occurrence of ii) negates the occurrence of i). Therefore token duplication is deterministically excluded.
Another requirement from section II indicates that the protocol should seldom incur token loss. In order to evaluate the occurrence of token loss, we need to analyze the other case of inconsistent termination of the protocol, when i) the source detects a protocol success and ii) the destination detects a protocol failure. For this case to occur, we need that the destination fails to receive the commit datagram, while the source correctly receives the ack datagram. The occurrence of both events cannot be excluded, and we briefly explore the possible scenarios that bring to this.
One event is the switch off of the destination after sending the ack message. The source considers the token successfully passed when it receives the ack, but the token holder will shut down and lose the token.
Another similar event is the switch off of the source after sending the move datagram, but before sending the commit. In that case the destination considers the token passing failed, and the token still held by the destination, which in fact shut down and lose the token.
The reader understands that both cases are covered by the assertion "if the token holder fails, the token is lost". The mean time between the occurrence of that event is not altered by the protocol, except for a negligible increment due to the fact that during the time between the receipt of the move datagram and the receipt of the ack datagram the switch off of either partners causes a token loss, doubling the probability of this event during that short lapse, the duration of which roughly corresponds to the latency of the commit operation.
Another event that causes the loss of the token is the failure in delivering the commit datagram due to a connectivity problem. Apart from the permanent failure of the routing between the source and the destination, the most frequent event is the loss of the commit datagram.
To harden our protocol against this event, we introduced the repeated sending of the commit datagram: since datagram loss events are poorly auto-correlated, we conclude that the probability to lose all datagrams in a sequence of n drops exponentially with n.
As for token latency, we consider that this corresponds to the interval between the send of the move datagram, and the latest time between the receipt of the earlyStop, and the send of the last commit datagram of the sequence (in case the earlyStop is lost). This time is bound to the communication delay between the source and the destination, and to the time between the successive resend of the same datagram. Since each datagram is successfully delivered after the first try with high probability, latency distribution is quite similar in shape to that of a ping.
Note that the presence of the earlyStop datagram is a key feature on this respect: without this message, the token latency should take into account the repeated delivery of n commit datagrams.
Another infrequent event that brings to a resend event is the failure in authenticating the datagram. As a general rule, the receiving agent will successfully check the datagram using the public key stored in the local directory: only in case the sending agent is not yet recorded in the directory the check will fail (an event somewhat connected with a join), and the sender will resend the datagram together with its certificate.
As for security issues, most of the work is done by the signatures carried by datagrams. The role of timestamps included in each of them is not of carrying any timing information, but of changing the signature of each and every datagram. Such a "timestamp" can be generated randomly as well.
Flushing an agent of invalid datagrams is not specially harmful, since these datagrams are only checked and silently discarded, without response. This fact, together with the use of the UDP protocol, makes identification of agents difficult using remote port scanning.
Given these premises, a malicious agent has no way to intrude the protocol at any stage, unless it manages to obtain either the private key of a member, or a valid certificate. In case an intruder obtains and replays a valid datagram (for instance, sniffing the network and identifying the datagram), it does damage the consistency of the protocol, as proved below:
• if the the datagram is not a move, and the session id does not correspond to a running session, the datagram is discarded;
• if the datagram is a move, the session id will necessarily precede the one recorded in the local soft state of the token, and the datagram is discarded;
• if the datagram is of any type and refers to the current session, the sender will ignore it (or will correctly use it if the good one went accidentally lost): the protocol is prepared to receive and discard multiple copies of any type of datagram in the current session;
A misbehaving Internet router may cause token loss events by corrupting or discarding valid datagrams: such behavior is regarded as marginal, since routers are kept under strict control by system administrators. The kind of inconsistency introduced by such behavior is quickly recovered after removal of the misbehaving agent.
A real threat comes from a misbehaving agent in possession of a valid private key or of a valid certificate. Such an agent may damage the consistency of the protocol: the worst scenario is the corruption of the membership database, but also token duplication may occur. Such damages will persist for a long time after the removal of the misbehaving agent. We note that such scenario is an instance of a Byzantine generals problem [6] , an efficient solution of which is still an open issue (that we do not dare to close with this paper).
From the above considerations, the reader understands that datagram encryption is useless, since it does not exclude any of previous scenarios. Unless a misbehaving agent holds a correct private key and certificate, it can not make any evil use of the information included in a data-gram.
Here we do not deal with the behavior of the application using the token: we simply note that the presence of the token should be signalled to these applications and that send events should affect their operation. Such topics fall outside the scope of this paper.
C. Experiments
A prototype of the token exchange operation as explained in this paper has been written in Perl, as well as part of the group membership protocol. The prototype was used to verify the feasibility of a protocol conforming to the requirements stated in section II, using the formal statement in section III. To obtain a realistic feedback about protocol reliability we run our tests in the open Internet, not in a restricted environment.
We refrain that our purpose is to study and design the token passing protocol, not the supported distributed coordination; therefore the preparation of a large testbed was not only expensive, but pointless. We configured a network of 4 hosts, located in Italy and Greece, thanks to the cooperation of the FORTH Institute in Crete. Three of them (located at CNAF, in Bologna, and FORTH) were used to carry out an endurance test, of which we report here, while the fourth one (located inside the Dept. of Computer Science of the University of Pisa) was used to test and debug join and leave operations.
We were able to obtain experimental evidence that the protocol tolerates Internet packet losses and delays while preserving the required properties of the token passing protocol, as introduced in the statement of the problem in section II, namely: i) the token is never duplicated, ii) token loss seldom occurs and iii) token passing latency dispersion is low.
During the experiment in the Internet, the token was delayed 10 seconds before being resent, to reproduce the execution of an operation controlled by the presence of the token: the design of the protocol is orthogonal with respect to the operation it controls.
We observed the first token loss event after 1, 792, 498 seconds of activity (approx. 20 days): during this time one of the members (A) was hit by the token 61, 206 times, with an average commute time of 29.29 seconds (expected 30 seconds), 99% of the times below 77.64 seconds. The token latency from agent A to agent B, located in the same network, and from A to C, located in a different country, were significantly different. Token latency between A and C was on the average 0.121 seconds, 99% of times below 0.615 seconds in a sample of 30563 operations. Latency between A and B was 0.009 seconds, 99% of times below 0.010. These observations prove that token latency has low dispersion (point iii) above).
The token passing protocol tolerated 60 network failures without producing a token loss: 37 network failures were detected by a timeout of the acknowledge datagram, 23 by a timeout of the commit datagram. The token was finally lost after a crash of the agent holding the token, which proves that token loss is an infrequent event (point ii) above).
No token duplication events were observed. Another series of experiments has been carried out in a virtual testbed with 10 hosts, implemented on a PC hosting User Mode Linux. While these experiments indicate a successful development methodology, their results are not relevant for the topics discussed in this paper.
IV. Conclusions
The design of the token passing operation should not be overlooked, since it must exhibit specific features in order to efficiently support distributed coordination tasks.
We propose a solution that specifically targets security aspects: all datagram used to exchange the tokens are signed by the sender, and authenticated by the receiver. The key distribution functionality is embedded in the token passing protocol itself, and has a negligible cost. The protocol uses information stored locally, and we suggest a straightforward solution for the maintenance of global information.
To assess the practical applicability of the conceptual design, we implemented a prototype and observed its behavior using the a testbed wired using public Internet links. After a 20 days long run, when the token was finally lost, we observed that the results are compatible with the requirements, namely respecting statistical expectation, reliability and absence of duplicate tokens.
